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are listed in the caption. The parties involved in this appeal 
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Appellants/Cross-Appellees and Joel Parker as Appellee/Cross-
Appellant. The third-party claims against Lloyd J. Webb and The 
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This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1998) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court properly determined 
that the parties had entered into a partnership agreement. 
Standard of Review: The applicable standard of review 
to determine whether parties had created a partnership is as 
follows: "On review, this Court is obligated to view the 
evidence and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a 
light most supportive of the findings of the trier of fact. The 
findings and judgment of the trial court will not be distributed 
when they are based on substantial, competent, admissible 
evidence. Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 
1983) . 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court properly determined 
that the real property used by the partnership prior to the death 
of Fred Parker was a partnership asset. 
Standard of Review: Whether a particular asset belongs 
to a partnership enterprise is a finding of fact. Cutler v. 
Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1975) 
3. Issue: Whether the trial court properly determined 
that there was clear and convincing evidence that Fred Parker 
gave to Joel as a gift one-half of the capital contributions that 
he has made to the partnership. 
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Standard of Review: "It rests primarily with the trial 
court to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing" 
and the test of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a finding 
under the clear and convincing standard is whether the evidence 
is reasonably sufficient. Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955). 
4. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding 
that, despite the unique facts of this case, Joel's labor was not 
a capital contribution to the partnership. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation 
of statutes is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1993). In interpreting 
common law, the appellate court affords no deference to the lower 
court. Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). 
Reference to Record Showing Preservation of Issue for 
Appeal: Defendant's Trial Brief, R. 122-23. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3, -4, -5, - 22, -37(2) (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of a dispute between a decedent's 
grandnephew, Joel Parker ("Joel"), and the decedent's legal heirs 
(the "heirs") over whether the decedent, Fred Parker ("Fred"), 
had entered into a partnership with Joel to carry on a cattle 
ranching business ("the partnership") and how that partnership 
should be wound up as a result of Fred's death. Joel filed an 
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action against the legal heirs, daughters of the decedent; Lloyd 
J. Webb (individually and as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Fred E. Parker) ("the executor"); and the Estate of 
Fred E. Parker. Joel alleged that he and his granduncle had 
entered into a partnership which included in its scope both 
cattle and certain real property located in Weber County, Utah 
("the property"). He, therefore, sought declaratory relief and 
damages under theories of unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, 
wrongful distribution and retention of property. R. 1-17. The 
heirs brought an action against Joel seeking declaratory relief, 
quiet title, accounting for partnership profits, profits or a 
fair rental value of the property, and slander of title. R. 31-
37. 
After a bench trial on the merits, the trial court 
found that a partnership existed between Joel and Fred, which 
partnership included both the cattle and property. The Court 
also declared that based upon clear and convincing evidence, Fred 
had gifted to Joel one-half of any money that he infused into the 
partnership thereby giving the partners equal capital 
contributions in the partnership. The Court ordered the cattle 
and the property sold and the net proceeds equally divided 
between the parties. The heirs appealed the trial court's 
decision. 
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B. Courts of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below 
Joel Parker adopts the heirs description of the course 
of proceedings and disposition in the court below. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The record establishes the following undisputed facts 
that are material to the issues on appeal: 
The parties to this litigation are all relatives of Fred 
Parker ("Fred") who was an eighty-year-old man living in Hailey, 
Idaho, until he died on October 25, 1992. R. 252, 254. 
Defendant/appellee Joel Parker ("Joel") was Fred's grandnephew 
who lived in Ogden, Utah, and was approximately twenty-seven 
years old at the time pertinent to this litigation. R. 252, 254. 
Plaintiffs/appellants Holly Wells, Shirley Sontag and Lucille 
Ditzengerger were Fred's daughters and legal heirs ("the heirs") 
who were respectively residents of California, Hawaii and Texas. 
R. 252. 
The trial court considered the quality of the parties' 
personal relationships to Fred pivotal in analyzing the issues 
raised in the bench trial. R. 282, pp. 201-02. Fred had been 
married on numerous occasions and had children from one or more 
of those marriages. R. 253. The relationship between Fred and 
his heirs was estranged and not close. Id. The heirs had no 
contact with Fred and did not attend his funeral. Id. When 
Joel's father called Shirley Sontag, one of Fred's heirs, to 
notify her of Fred's funeral she replied "I don't feel I should 
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even be there because I did not come and see him when he was 
alive." R. 282, p. 56. While the court found there was no 
obligation for the heirs to remain in contact with Fred or attend 
his funeral, it determined the estrangement in this relationship 
to be "a critical fact when looking at the case." R. 282, pp. 
201-02. 
By contrast, the relationship between Fred and Joel became 
as close as that of a father to his son. R. 253. Although Joel 
had known Fred since he was four or five years old, his 
relationship with his grand uncle really developed in 1988 or 
1989 when Joel went to the hospital to care for Fred after a bout 
of pneumonia. R. 282, p. 6. Every other family member Fred had 
called to take care of him had declined. Id. 
For a year or two, during and after Fred's recovery, Fred 
and Joel spent time together discussing which of Joel's various 
interests Fred might help Joel develop into a career. Id. at 6-
7. Fred initially was more serious than Joel in this quest. 
Fred asked constantly, "What do you want to do? . . . You know, 
we could get you going." Id. at 147-48. Fred's words were "with 
your youth and my wisdom and age and cold-hard cash on the corner 
of the table, there isn't nothing we can't do." Id. at 148. 
Although Fred and Joel discussed careers in trucking and farming, 
Fred repeatedly mentioned ranching as an option because it was a 
profession that he had "loved . . . with all his heart and mind." 
Id. at 6-9. 
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In about 1990, Joel purchased his first heifer and began 
raising it on a neighbor's property. Id. at 10-11. When Joel 
was considering buying more cows, he invited Fred to come into 
the business with him. Id. at 9. "I go, do you want to get into 
it? And he said yes, and how much money do you need?" Id. When 
Joel responded that the heifers he intended to purchase would 
cost about $2,000, Fred said, "Will $5,000 do?" He said, "Who 
knows, maybe you will see something else." Id. 
When Joel realized that the cows he had selected were 
already sold, he asked Fred what to do with the $5,0 00 Fred had 
sent him. Id. at 12. Because Fred instructed him to just hold 
onto it, Joel created a checking account and deposited the money. 
Id. at 12 & 45. Joel understood at that time that he and Fred 
had formed a partnership: "My understanding is we were going to 
start into the cattle and ranch business." Id. at 13 & 19, 144-
49. Their business plan was to reinvest any profits and "try to 
build or establish something big." Id. at 149. 
From the inception of the partnership, Fred and Joel 
operated on the premise that Fred would contribute all the money 
while Joel contributed all the labor. Id. at 148 & 85. "That's 
what I had, my youth, my work I am able to do, the stuff, that 
was the value of me. He had the money." Id. at 73-74. If Joel 
needed more money, he only needed to ask Fred for it. Id. at 45. 
If work needed to be done, Joel always did it: "I was the one 
that was doing the deal, the work, handling everything. He was 
the money man. Because there is no way he could do the work I 
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was doing or set-up the things I set-up, or any of that." Id. at 
96. Thus, Joel and Fred realized they were totally 
interdependent and that their partnership would not work without 
a full commitment from each of them. Id. at 148-49. 
Between March and May of 1990, Fred bought a total of 
thirty-five heifers and a bull, which he sent to Joel for use in 
their cattle operation. Id. at 14-15 In August of 1990, Fred 
purchased and sent another seven cows and eight calves. Fred 
elected to title all of the cattle in Joel's name. R. 254; R. 
282, pp. 37, 150. Plaintiff's Exhibits 14, 29. Fred then sent 
Joel $3,300 for feed and expenses. R. 282, p. 20. 
From the inception of the cattle partnership, Joel labored 
single-handedly to care for the cattle and to perform tasks that 
would minimize Fred's expenses. Id. at 17. He bartered 
extensively to eliminate costs for the care, feed and pasturing 
of the cattle. Id. at 17 & 54. Although he worked seven days a 
week and was, at times, "on call" twenty-four hours a day, Joel 
never kept track of his time nor did he ask Fred for compensation 
for his labor. Id. at 55 & 128. 
Neither Joel nor Fred set-up books or records to keep track 
of expenses for their cattle operation, but they did discuss 
those expenses. Id. at 21, 87-88. Joel had no training in any 
farm record-keeping method, although he was a high school 
graduate. Id. at 9. Joel testified that, at that time, he just 
did what he felt was right, and Fred had no problem with it. Id. 
at 105 & 87. When Joel asked Fred about the need for record-
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keeping, Fred "would always basically just tell me don't worry 
about it, we will take care of it, you know." Id. at 21-22. 
In 1990, Fred and Joel did discuss how to handle their 
cattle partnership on their tax returns. Joel suggested his 
taking a third of the deduction on his taxes and allowing Fred 
two-thirds because Joel believed that he did not need further 
deductions. Id. at 77. Both Joel and Fred believed that in 
dealing with the IRS, some taxes were preferable to none because 
"humongous losses" became a red flag to the IRS. Id. at 78. 
As soon as Joel and Fred accumulated their first cows, Fred 
told Joel that their next step in the project was to locate 
property. Id. at 182-83. Joel contacted real estate agents, and 
Joel and Fred would look at any property that sounded promising. 
Id. In Joel's mind, it was "just implied that we was going to 
grow into a cattle ranch, ranching cows, you know. Fred knew he 
was on his way out. He didn't have a lot more years." Id. at 
182 Sc 13. 
In the fall of 1990, after they determined that a 1000 acre 
parcel in Weber County ("the property") would meet their needs, 
Joel contacted the railroad that owned the property. Id. at 152. 
Fred told Joel, "You see what you can get worked out. If you can 
put together a good enough deal, we got the money." Id. at 154 & 
35. Joel did all of the negotiating and successfully reduced the 
purchase price from about $300,000 to $116,700. Id. at 153 & 91. 
Upon receiving the Offer to Purchase from the railroad, Joel 
informed Fred that the sellers wanted to know what kind of entity 
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intended to purchase the property. id,, at 33. After Fred 
elected "partnership- as purchaser, he voluntarily filled out 
143-44. Fred had told him: "Well, it was just Joel and I are in 
this partnership together and he turned and just waved, you know, 
at 22 & 83-84. He did, however, treat the business account as 
personal money because he could not get any direction from Fred's 
estate. Id. at 26. Joel had his father fax Fred's executor a 
copy of the Offer to Purchase and Affidavit indicating Joel's 
interest in the property. Id. at 28 & 104. Joel did not, 
however, hear anything from the executor for over a year when the 
executor instructed him to "hold tight" and carry on as before 
Fred's death. Id. at 27 & 79. The heir's and the executor knew 
that Joel was managing the cattle, but never provided him any 
guidance, offered any compensation, or complained. Id. at 90, 
165 8c 170. 
In 1994, Joel purchased a five-acre parcel adjoining the 
property ("the corner parcel") from Weber County for $1,500.3 
Id. at 67. Although he was alreaidy involved in a dispute with 
the heirs over his rights, he believed that if the property was a 
partnership asset, this corner parcel would provide better 
access. Id. at 65. If not, then he believed that the corner 
parcel was his. Id. 
and no agreement with the heirs was forthcoming. Id. at 73 & 79-
80. Joel also acknowledged in the cattle sale contract that Fred 
might hold an equitable interest in the cattle as a result of 
their partnership before Fred's death. R. 282, p. 86; Agreement 
of Purchase and Sale, 1(4, Exhibit 2 8 (Addendum B). 
Joel recognized that there were delays in winding up the 
partnership, but he attributed these delays to Fred's executor's 
refusal to acknowledge the existence of the partnership. Id. at 
62. From the inception of the partnership until the time of 
trial, Joel calculated that the fair value of his work, less 
$5,000-10,000 for personal use, came to approximately $101,000. 
Id. at 70-72. Joel's calculation of $101,000 for his 
contribution to the partnership included taking care of the 
cattle, negotiating for the property, bartering, trading with 
other people, reducing the taxes and miscellaneous contributions 
to the partnership. Id. at 98. His estimates were supported by 
third-party testimony concerning reasonable compensation for his 
workload given by an experienced dairyman. Id. at 123 & 128-3 0. 
The heirs presented no contrary testimony. 
Despite all Joel's efforts, the heirs denied that any 
partnership was formed and denied that Joel was entitled to any 
compensation for his labor. R. 141, 145-151; R. 282, pp. 186-88. 
Joel, therefore, filed a Notice of Interest on the property, but 
the executor transferred the property to the heirs through a 
Personal Representative's Deed. R. 117. When Joel and the heirs 
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were unable to resolve issues of ownership of the cattle and 
land, this lawsuit followed. 
At trial, Joel argued that a partnership existed which 
included the cattle and the property. R. 113-124; R. 282, pp. 
186-88. Joel argued in the alternative that: (1) his pre-
dissolution labor was compensable based upon the partnership 
understanding; (2) his labor was his capital contribution; (3) 
Fred gave Joel part of his capital contribution as a gift4; and 
(4) or if no partnership was found, that Joel should be 
compensated for his labor in quantum meruit. R. 121-23. The 
heirs argued that no partnership existed, the property was not a 
partnership asset, and that they were entitled to a return of 
Fred's capital contribution which consisted of the amounts paid 
for cattle, land, property taxes, and expenses. R. 152-154; R. 
282, p 194. (Appellant's Br. at 12). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the decision of the trial court on 
all issues appealed by the heirs/appellants. Undisputed material 
facts demonstrate that the cattle and ranching business 
established by Fred and Joel was a partnership which included 
4
 Appellants cite argument in their own memorandum for the 
alleged "fact" that Joel presented no evidence that any portion 
of Fred's capital contribution was a gift. Appellant's Br. at 
12 (citing R. 185). Their legal argument is not a fact. 
Further, it is for the court to determine whether testimony 
presented at trial constitutes "fact" supporting a particular 
legal theory. 
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both land and cattle, and that half of Fred's capital 
contribution to the partnership was a gift to Joel. 
The trial court's decision on the existence of partnership 
is supported by substantial evidence concerning Fred's and Joel's 
intentions and conduct. The partnership was premised on the 
reality that each partner possessed an essential resource that 
the other entirely lacked. Fred could provide only money and 
wisdom, while Joel could add labor and management, barter for 
services, negotiate contracts, and physically oversee their 
cattle operation. To make their partnership succeed under these 
restrictions, Fred explained and implicitly promised to Joel that 
all their partnership purposes, Joel's labor would be equal to 
Fred's money. Under this premise, Fred infused into the 
partnership sufficient funds to purchase the property and cattle, 
while Joel committed uncompensated labor which he estimated to 
valued at over $100,000. 
While their informal partnership did not conform to standard 
commercial practices for recordkeeping, tax allocation, and 
titling, the parties executed these responsibilities without 
complaint and in a manner that served their business purposes. 
They agreed to title all the cattle in Joel's name, and the 
property in Fred's name to avoid problems with creditors. 
The trial court correctly determined that the property was a 
partnership asset because Fred and Joel intended to acquire the 
property for partnership purposes and they devoted it exclusively 
to partnership use. Single-handedly and without compensation, 
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Joel selected the property, negotiated an affordable price, and 
decreased the property taxes. Although Fred financed the 
property's purchase, he never saw it until a year afterwards. 
Although Fred and Joel ultimately titled the property in 
Fred's name for creditor protection, they fully intended that the 
property belong to the partnership. Fred verified this intent in 
a sworn affidavit sent to the property's seller. 
The court also correctly concluded that because of Fred's 
death, the partnership should be dissolved and woundup by selling 
the land and cattle and dividing the proceeds equally between the 
parties, Joel, as Fred's partner, and Fred's heirs. The trial 
court concluded that the heirs were not entitled to a return of 
Fred's capital contribution because "clear and convincing" 
evidence demonstrated Fred had given one-half (1/2) of his 
capital contribution to Joel. 
In its gift determination, the trial court relied upon a 
totality of the evidence and the credibility and candor of Joel 
to find the elements of donative intent, delivery and acceptance. 
Donative intent was supported by Fred and Joel's family 
relationship and their close friendship. Substantial evidence 
supported the finding that Fred had no intent that upon his death 
Joel would not be entitled to any partnership asset because of a 
lack of capital contribution. Fred's words and conduct 
demonstrated his intent to contribute to Joel personally as 
opposed to merely investing in a business. Facts material to 
acceptance and delivery are colored by the reality that Fred only 
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intended to give Joel one-half (1/2) of the money he contributed 
and he intended to remain a one-half (1/2) owner of assets 
purchased with that money. Thus, the conduct of Fred and Joel, 
fully acting as co-owners of the property and cattle, was 
consistent with the gift theory adopted by the trial court. 
If this Court should reverse the gift determination, there 
exists alternative grounds on which to affirm the trial court's 
conclusions on winding-up, which grounds include promissory 
estoppel or an agreement contrary to the statutory priority 
accorded capital contribution. This Court could agree with 
precedent that an oral partnership agreement equating one's labor 
with another's money justifies equal division of all assets on 
distribution without regard to capital contribution. 
Finally, this Court could find that the trial court erred in 
concluding that Joel's labor was not a capital contribution under 
the unique and limited circumstances of this case. Even if labor 
is generally not a capital contribution, where there exists an 
expressed or implied agreement that "sweat equity" by the 
laboring partner equals "dollar equity" of the financing partner, 
that agreement converts labor into a capital contribution for 
purposes of partnership dissolution. 
Because appellants failed to meet their burden on appeal to 
overturn the trial court's decisions, this Court should promptly 




The heirs have appealed the trial court's decision 
challenging determinations that a partnership existed between 
Fred and his grand nephew Joel, that the partnership included 
property used for the ranch, and that half of Fred's capital 
contribution was a gift to Joel. Because these issues are 
interrelated and fact-sensitive, this Court should be aware of 
certain findings and comments that the trial court considered 
critical to all three issues. 
The trial court described Joel as a candid witness who did 
not stretch the facts during his testimony. R. 283, p. 13. This 
observation on credibility is critical because Joel was called as 
a witness by his opponents, his testimony was uncontroverted, and 
he testified heavily, without objection, about his past 
conversations with his deceased grand-uncle Fred. 
In assessing testimony that is uncontroverted because 
certain central parties were no longer alive at the time of 
trial, the trial court nevertheless will determine whether 
testimony concerning the deceased was "self-serving and not 
believable in view of the witness's conduct, demeanor and 
substantive testimony during trial." Homer v Smith, 866 P.2d 
622, 627 (Utah App. 1993) . An appellate court defers to the fact 
finder who is "in the best position to judge the credibility of 
witnesses and is free to disbelieve their testimony." .Id. The 
trial court believed Joel. 
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The trial court also found that Fred was a capable, 
coherent, and astute elderly gentleman who was not a person that 
Joel could take advantage of. R. 253. It declared the 
"father/son" relationship between Fred and Joel to be pivotal to 
its decision. R. 253. It also considered Fred's estranged 
relationship with his heirs to be critical in analyzing the very 
issues raised in this appeal. R. 282, pg. 201-02. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT 
FRED'S AND JOEL'S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WAS A PARTNERSHIP. 
A. This Court should review with deference the trial 
court's decision that a partnership existed. 
In reviewing a determination about the existence of a 
partnership, an appellate court "is obliged to view the evidence 
and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most 
supportive of the findings of the trier of fact. The findings 
and judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed when they 
are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence." 
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1983); Cutler 
v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349, 1350-51 (Utah 1975), (affirming 
partnership existence as finding of fact). "On conflicting 
evidence, the question of whether a partnership exists is one for 
the trier of fact." Murphy v Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 85 (Wyo. 
1982) (finding oral agreement constituted partnership). "Persons 
who intend to do the things that constitute a partnership are 
partners whether their express purpose was to create or avoid the 
relationship." Id. 
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Even if this Court reviews the issue of partnership 
existence as a mixed question of law and fact, the trial court's 
decision should be reviewed with "broad discretion." State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994). Substantial deference to 
the trial court is appropriate because (1) the facts to which 
these legal rules would be applied are "so complex and varying" 
that no rule could adequately address their relevance; (2) 
appellate judges have not definitively determined outcome 
determinative factors; and (3) the trial judge observed 
witnesses' demeanor and appearance which cannot be sufficiently 
reflected on the record. Id. at 939. These factors dictate that 
the trial court had discretion "to reach one of several possible 
conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts 
without risking reversal." Id. at 937. 
B. The facts more than adequately demonstrate that the 
business relationship was a partnership. 
The trial court found that Fred's and Joel's cattle and 
ranch business constituted a partnership in which both partners 
actively participated from the inception of the partnership 
arrangement. R. 253-254. The Utah Code defines partnership as 
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1998). "The 
requisites of a partnership are that the parties must have joined 
together to carry on a trade or adventure for their common 
benefit, each contributing property or services, and having a 
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community of interest in the profits." Bentley v. Brossard, 94 
P.736, 741 (Utah 1908) . 
1. Joel and Fred intended to create a partnership and 
carried on as co-owners in their business. 
"Whether the parties were partners depends on their 
intentions and conduct." Holmes v. Holmes, 849 P.2d 1140, 1143 
(Or. App.) (affirming finding of partnership); adhered to as 
modified, 855 P.2d 1164 (Or. App.); rev, denied, 862 P.2d 1305 
(Or. 1993). "When there is no written agreement, the court looks 
primarily to the parties' conduct and course of dealing to 
determine whether a partnership existed." Id. 
The trial court found that it was Fred's intent that Joel 
would be his 50/50 partner. R. 255. Fred and Joel acted as co-
owners in that they actively participated in the partnership, 
contacted each other on a regular basis, and each kept apprised 
of their business. R. 253. 
The trial court also found Joel's and Fred's statements to 
third parties consistent with their intent that their business 
relationship was a partnership. R. 254. Joel eventually sold 
the cattle after Fred's death through a contract acknowledging 
the potential interest of Fred's estate because of the 
partnership. Agreement of Purchase and Sale #4, Exhibit 2 8 
(Addendum B). Fred described his relationship with Joel to a 
neighbor as a partnership relationship. R. 254. He swore in an 
affidavit to the railroad that property he was financing was 
being purchased by a "partnership" with Joel. R. 254. 
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2. The contributions of Fred and Joel to the business 
enterprise indicate that their relationship was a partnership. 
"One of the primary matters to consider in determining 
whether a partnership exists is the nature of the contribution 
each party makes to the enterprise." Cutler v Bowen, 543 P.2d 
1349, 1351 (Utah 1975) "It need not be in the form of tangible 
assets or capital, but, as is frequently done, one partner may 
make such a contribution, and this may be balanced by the other's 
performance of services and the shouldering of responsibility." 
Id. 
The trial court found that both Fred and Joel actively 
contributed to the partnership. R. 253. They acted consistently 
with their repeatedly expressed premise that Fred would supply 
the funding and wisdom while Joel contributed energy, labor, and 
legwork. R. 282, pp. 85, 148, 73-74, 96. Based upon this 
premise, Fred infused money to purchase land and cattle without 
any provision for repayment while Joel committed uncompensated 
labor which he estimated to be valued at over $100,000. Id. at 
14, 20, 153, 70-72. 
3. Fred and Joel had a common interest in the profits of 
their partnership. 
Fred and Joel expressed common interests in both the short 
term and long term profits of their business. Their business 
plan was to reinvest any profits and "try to build or establish 
something big." Id. at 149. They also discussed their ultimate 
profit making goal: "And like me and Fred talked, we always 
250X22885 1 23 
figured we would never let the place go until it was worth over a 
million dollars, you know." Id. at 155. 
4. The conduct of Fred and Joel regarding partnership 
records/ taxes, and titling of property was consistent with their 
own purposefully individualized business plan. 
Although the recordkeeping for the partnership did not 
conform to model commercial partnership-business practices, the 
trial court was persuaded that their informal approach to 
business matters was consistent with partnership. R. 254. The 
trial court found that the responsibility to keep partnership 
records fell equally on both of them. R. 256. But, Fred and 
Joel's trust in each other made record keeping unnecessary. R. 
282, P. 21-22. Fred never asked for an account of Joel's labor 
nor an account of his expenditures of Fred's money. Id. at 87, 
105. In fact, Fred expressed an aversion to help from business 
professionals. Id. at 102. 
Contrary to the heirs' contention in their appeal, 
Appellant's Br. at 17-18, the above-described actions Fred and 
Joel clearly distinguish the instant case from Johanson Bros, v. 
Industrial Comm'n., 118 Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563, 567 (1950) as to 
the elements of partnership that court deemed material. In 
Johanson, some of the workmen did not even know they were 
partners; they had no rights in management or control; they had 
no ownership in any business equipment; only the employer could 
contract for jobs; they were not consulted on methods of 
operation or the identity of copartners or results to be 
accomplished; and there was no settling of affairs when an 
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employee was released. Id. at 567. Thus, the Johanson decision 
provides no support for the heirs' appeal of the trial court's 
decision finding partnership. 
C• If this Court should reverse the trial court's decision 
recognizing a partnership, then it should award Joel 
compensation for his services through quantum meruit. 
If this Court should reverse the trial court's decision on 
partnership, Joel should be compensated fairly for all his 
efforts through the theory of Quantum Meruit. Under that theory, 
Joel could receive the value of his services if (1) Fred received 
a benefit from Joel's labors; (2) Fred knew of or appreciated 
that benefit; and (3) circumstances would make it unjust for Fred 
to retain the benefit without paying for it. See Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987). Contrary to 
Appellant's contention, recovery in quantum meruit would not 
contravene Utah partnership law, denying compensation for 
partner's services to a partnership, because Joel's claim under 
quantum meruit arises only if the trial court's decision finding 
partnership is reversed. 
This Court, however, should never have to reach the issue of 
recovery under Quantum Meruit because evidence of a partnership 
was compelling. During the bench trial, even counsel for the 
heirs admitted the existence of partnership, stating in closing 
argument, "We believe there is a partnership here. . . We don't 
dispute that." R. 282, p.188. Instead, it was only "the extent 
of the partnership" that the heirs actually considered at issue. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THE 
PROPERTY PURCHASED BY FRED WAS A PARTNERSHIP ASSET. 
Approximately a year after the creation of their cattle 
partnership, Fred and Joel purchased the property, a thousand 
acres in Weber County that the trial court found was a 
partnership asset. R. 254, 257-58. According to state statute, 
"All property originally brought into the partnership's stock or 
subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the 
partnership is partnership property." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 
(1998) . A partnership agreement to hold and use land as a 
partnership asset need not be in writing. An oral agreement is 
valid and may be enforced between the parties. Swarthout v 
Gentry, 144 P.2d 38, 43 (Ca. 1943). Thus, the trial court's 
finding that the property was a partnership asset should be 
affirmed. 
A. This Court should defer to the trial courts decision 
that the property was a partnership asset. 
Whether a particular asset belongs to a partnership 
enterprise is a finding of fact. See Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 
1349, 1352 (Utah 1975) (affirming good will as partnership 
asset). More particularly, in reviewing a trial court's decision 
as to whether a particular piece of real property titled in one 
partner's name is actually partnership property, the Supreme 
Court of Utah declared: 
[W]e do not disturb his findings and judgment 
merely because we might have viewed the 
matter differently, but would do so only if 
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it appeared that the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them, or that he has so 
abused his discretion or misapplied the law, 
that an injustice has resulted. 
Corbet v Corbet, 472 P.2d 430, 432-33 (Utah, 1970); see also 
Dotson v Grice, 647 P.2d 409, 411 (N.M. 1982) (whether real 
property is partnership asset remains question of fact even when 
the partners have not changed record title into the partnership); 
Lutz v Schmillen, 899 P.2d 861, 864 (Wyo. 1995) (appellate court 
should refuse to set aside findings about whether real property 
is partnership asset unless they are clearly erroneous and leave 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed).5 
B. The facts indicating "partnership asset" clearly 
overcome any alleged presumption of individual 
ownership created by title. 
The heirs, as appellants, argue that there exists a 
presumption that ownership of real property vests in the 
individual titleholder, not the partnership. Appellant's Br. at 
19-20. They note that the intent of the parties controls the 
issue and cite cases from foreign jurisdictions in alleging that 
overcoming this presumption requires clear and convincing 
evidence of intent to include real property as a partnership 
asset.6 Id. Their Brief cites a Colorado decision for the 
5
 As noted in Section A of Point I, if this Court 
determines that the partnerships asset issue is a mixed question 
of fact and law, nevertheless, the trial court's decision should 
be reviewed with "broad discretion." 
6Whether this presumption exists in Utah and the burden of 
proof to overcome the presumption is uncertain. 
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factors indicative of intent. Id. Significantly, that decision 
notes: "The intent of the parties with respect to the issue of 
contribution of the property is a question of fact which is 
binding upon appeal unless there is no competent evidence to 
support that finding. See Standring v. Standring, 794 P.2d 1089, 
1091, (Colo. App. 1990). Utah courts not only consider intent 
as a question of fact, Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 
108 (Utah 1991), but, also consider that "it rests primarily with 
the trial court to determine whether the evidence was clear and 
convincing. Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust Co., 286 P.2d 
1065, 1068 (Utah 1955) . 
The trial court in this case not only found that the 
partnership purchased the property, but also that both Fred and 
Joel desired to obtain the property for the partnership. R. 254. 
Although the trial court did not use the words "clear and 
convincing" it stated: "There is no question in my mind, and I 
find as fact, that the intent of Fred was that this property and 
the cows be considered as part of the partnership between the 
parties." R. 282, p. 189. 
The interrelationship between the presumption that 
"ownership vests with a titled party" and "partnership property" 
has been explained as follows: Whereas purchasers and creditors 
"have the right to rely on the title to the real estate as shown 
by the record," as between the parties, the controlling factor to 
determine whether real property belongs to a partnership is the 
parties' intent. In Re Pearies Estate, 192 P.2d 532, 536 (Mont. 
1948) (implying agreement that real estate is firm asset from 
parties' conduct, circumstances attending the land transaction, 
and treating the real estate as partnership property.) See also, 
Swarthout v Gentry, 144 P.2d 38, 44 (Ca. 1943) (finding land not 
purchased with partnership funds to be partnership property 
because titled partner contributed land as firm asset); Lutz v 
Schmillen, 899 P.2d 861, 864 (Wyo. 1995) (declaring ranch to be 
partnership asset despite one party's acquiring financing and 
title because of conduct, property's use, and purpose of 
acquisition to devote the property to partnership purposes). 
C. Fred and Joel intended the scope of their ranching 
partnership to encompass both cattle and land/ and they 
used the property for partnership purposes. 
[T]he chief criterion to determine whether property belongs 
to a partnership is "the intent of the partners to devote it to 
partnership purposes." Zanetti v. Zanetti, 175 P.2d 603, 606 
(Ca. App. 1947). Thus by finding that it was Fred's desire that 
the property be held by the partnership and used for the cattle 
ranching business, the trial court correctly determined that the 
property was a partnership asset. R. 255. 
Fred's and Joel's acquisition and use of the property was 
entirely for the partnership purposes of cattle ranching. R. 
282, P. 161. Each in their own way contributed to remodeling and 
cleanups for this purpose. Id. at 38, 161-62. Furthermore, 
both Joel and Fred intended that their ultimate partnership 
profit would occur when the property was sold. Joel believed, 
and it was Fred's own experience, that an eventual sale for 
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subdivision purposes was the only way a cattle ranching operation 
ever actually succeeded. R. 282, p.8. They, therefore intended 
to hold on to the property until they could sell it for a million 
dollars. " Id^ . at 155. 
Joel's uncompensated efforts relating to the property only 
make sense if the property was a partnership asset. A partner 
donating considerable time to an alleged partnership asset 
without compensation, indicates that the partnership includes 
that alleged asset. See Kimball v McCornick, 259 P. 313, 316 
(Utah 1927). Single-handedly and without any remuneration, Joel 
selected the property, negotiated its purchase and price, and 
decreased taxes. R. 282, pp. 35, 153, 91-92, 159-60. He alone 
made acquisition of the property an affordable reality for the 
partnership and a useable asset. Id. at 35, 154. Fred relied 
entirely upon Joel. In fact, Fred did not even see the property 
until a year after its purchase. Id. at 162-63. 
At the critical time during the purchasing process, Joel 
permitted Fred to determine whether the partnership or Fred 
individually would be "purchaser" of the property. Id. at 33-36, 
92. Fred swore to the third-party sellers in an affidavit that 
the purchaser was the partnership. See Affidavit, Exhibit C to 
Offer to Purchase Real Property, Exhibit 3 0 (Addendum A). 
Although Fred made later business judgments about titling, this 
affidavit is the only document wherein he gives his oath to 
truthfully setting forth his intent as to ownership of the 
property. 
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D. Fred and Joel did not intend their business decision to 
title the property in Fred's name to change the status 
of the property from a partnership asset. 
In the process of purchasing the property, Fred and Joel 
initially signed an Offer to Purchase describing their 
partnership as purchaser of the property. Id. Later, they 
agreed to title the property in Fred's name. R. 282, P. 37, 94. 
The trial court found that this decision conformed to 
personal business needs and was not intended to change the 
property from a partnership asset. R. 254-55. This decision, 
made without assistance of lawyers, was intended for creditor 
protection: the cattle were titled in Joel's name, and the 
property in Fred's. Id. at 255. The trial court noted: "I 
think [Fred] was doing what many men want to do without a lawyer, 
looking at a young man and saying if he gets into trouble I don't 
want it to come back against the property." R. 2 82, p. 18 9. 
Similarly, in Holmes, 849 P,2d at 1143, the title to certain 
Oregon ranch property was transferred to the father individually 
to accomplish the partners' business purpose of lessening the 
partnership's over-all expenses. The Holmes court found the 
ranch remained a partnership asset. Id. Despite Fred's and 
Joel's business decision judgment about titling, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's decision that the property was a 
partnership asset. 
Finally, contrary to the heirs' contentions in their Brief, 
Appellant's Br. at 23, Frandsen v. Holladav, 739 P.2d 1111 (Utah 
App. 1987), provides no support for a reversal of the trial 
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court's finding that the property was partnership property. 
Notably, the Frandsen court, without detailing any facts, upheld 
the trial court's "ultimate finding" about the partnership asset 
issue as supported by "substantial, competent evidence on the 
record." Id. at 1113. It noted that the trial court had (1) 
obviously recognized that the deed title was "not conclusive on 
the issue of whether the land was or was not partnership property 
for purposes of [Utah Code Ann.] section 48-1-22;" and (2) 
instead examined the conduct of the parties to determine their 
intent. Id. Thus, the Frandsen decision merely supports an 
appellate court's upholding a trial court's decision and provides 
no factual analogy supportive of this Court's reversing the trial 
court. 
E. If this Court reverses the trial court's decision 
finding that the property was a partnership asset, then it should 
also reverse its finding that the corner parcel was partnership 
property. 
If this Court reverses either the trial court's decision 
finding a partnership or its determination that the property is a 
partnership asset, it should also reverse the trial court's 
determination that the corner parcel, a five-acre parcel of land 
in Weber County that Joel purchased in 1994, was partnership 
property. R. 258. Joel purchased the corner parcel with his own 
funds and intended it to be part of his contribution to a land-
and-cattle partnership. R. 257-58. The corner parcel was 
purchased to provide improved access to existing partnership 
property and to increase the value of the entire partnership 
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property. R. 282, pp. 65-66. When Joel purchased the corner 
parcel, however, he was already involved in a controvei~sy with 
the heirs. He believed that " [i]f it was not a partnership, 
then that ground was mine." Id. at 65. 
As discussed previously, a decision that real property, 
financed by and titled in one pairtner, is a partnership asset 
depends largely upon intent and the purpose of acquisition to 
devote the property to partnership purposes. Lutz, 8 99 P.2d at 
864. All of the partnership purposes for which Joel intended the 
purchase the corner parcel are defeated if the property is not 
first declared partnership property. Setting aside the findings 
and conclusion declaring the corner parcel as a partnership asset 
would be appropriate because a reversal negating the property's 
status as a partnership asset would create a "definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. Therefore, 
if "partnership" including the property does not exist, then the 
corner parcel should be declared Joel's property. 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that 
this Court should not have to reaich this sub-issue because 
substantial evidence supports affirming the trial court's 
decision declaring a partnership including land and cattle. 
POINT1 III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ONE-HALF OF FRED'S 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE PARTNERSHIP WAS A GIFT TO JOEL, 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision finding 
one-half of Fred's capital contribution to be a gift to Joel and 
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implicitly denying the heirs' demand for a return of the entire 
capital contribution.7 The trial court found clear and 
convincing evidence that the "contributions of cash to the 
partnership were 50/50. The 50% for Joel being contributed by 
Fred as a gift to Joel."8 R. 255, 258. 
In reviewing this decision, this Court should be aware that 
in the context of gift, "it rests primarily with the trial court 
to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing." 
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.. 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah 
1955). Undisputed collateral evidence is sufficient to prove 
"gift" at the clear and convincing standard. Id. For purposes 
of appellate review of this issue, "the test of the sufficiency 
7
 The heirs have requested that this Court remand this 
case with instructions to award them "the property at issue, 
including the real property." Appellants' Br. at 34-35. 
However, as a matter of clarification, Fred's actual capital 
contribution was money, not land or cattle. All conversations 
about their partnership stated that while Joel would provide 
labor, Fred would provide start-up money. R. 1-2; R. 2 82, pp. 
13-14. Nowhere in the transcript is Fred described as an 
independent cattle owner or landowner who would, or did, 
contribute these personal assets to a partnership. Thus even if 
this Court reverses the trial court on the "gift" issue, the 
heirs are not entitled to the property. 
8
 Appellants were misleading in stating that the "gift" 
issue was only superficially raised. Appellant's Br. at 25 n.3. 
The gift theory was clearly set forth in Joel's Trial Brief. 
R. 123-24. At trial, based upon the trial court's having 
thoroughly reviewed the Trial Briefs, counsel for both parties 
elected to forego opening arguments. R. 282, pp. 3, 185. 
Closing arguments were only to supplement the Briefs. Id. at 
185, 186. Thus, the trial was conducted with minimal legal oral 
argument. Counsel left it to the trial court to evaluate 




of the evidence is "whether the evidence is reasonably 
sufficient." Id. 
The trial court determined that the burden to prove "gift" 
was satisfied through the totality of the evidence and Joel's 
credibility and candid testimony. During the hearing on Motion 
to Reconsider the trial court stated, "I heard throughout the 
whole trial without the use of the word gift that [the capital 
contribution] was a gift." R. 283, p. 13. In assessing Joel's 
testimony in terms of the gift issue, the trial court noted, "He 
could obviously have stretched it. I thought he was extremely 
candid in his testimony." R. 283, p. 13. This Court 
consistently defers to trial court decisions based upon these 
grounds because an appellate court cannot garner a sense of the 
proceeding as a whole from the cold record. Poulsen v. Frear, 
946 P.2d 738 (Utah App. 1997). 
A. Fred intended that 50% of anything that he contributed 
to the partnership belong to Joel. 
To find an intervivos gift, a trial court must find clear 
and convincing evidence of the donor's intent, delivery, and 
acceptance. Estate of Ross v. Ross, 626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 
1981). In assessing Fred's intent, it is important to revisit 
the trial court's findings about his character. Fred was fully 
aware of what he was doing and was conscious of the reality that 
his life expectancy was limited. R. 253, 256. 
For purposes of proving gift, Joel's family relationship 
with Fred is significant. West v. West, 403 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 
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1965) (trial court may rely on "the fact that it is natural to 
make a gift to a member of one's family.") Joel and Fred had a 
"clear family relationship" that was as close as a father/son 
relationship. R. 255-56, 253. By contrast, Fred's relationship 
with his heirs was estranged and lacked any contact. R. 253. 
Fred and Joel's close friendship can also become a factor in 
finding clear and convincing evidence of gift. Sims v. George, 
466 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah 1970) (validating gift of stocks from 
elderly gentleman to long-term friend). Friendship constituted a 
reasonable basis for believing that "there were reasons best 
known to [the elderly gentleman] himself why because of the long-
time special friendship he wanted to have the privilege of giving 
part of his property to the defendant instead of keeping it all 
until his death." Id. Similarly, the trial court found, "Joel's 
cash contribution was given to Joel by Fred as Joel was one of 
the only individuals Fred had a great caring for." R. 255-56. 
The evidence supports the trial court's finding that Fred 
had "no intent that upon his death, Joel would not be entitled to 
any of the partnership assets because of a lack of capital 
contribution." R. 256. "Fred had no intention that his money 
that was given to Joel would in some way come back to him other 
than a . . . 50/50 relationship." R. 283 pg. 13. These findings 
are logical inferences from Fred's conduct and statements such 
as, "If you can put together a good enough deal, we got the 
money," R. 282, p. 154. (emphasis added), and his assuring Joel 
that Joel need not worry about Fred's heirs taking away Joel's 
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ownership interest in the property because Fred's heirs had no 
interest in him or his property. Id. at 55-56. 
These findings are also consistent with Joel's and Fred's 
partnership premise that each would give the best of what they 
had. R. 1-2; R. 282, pp. 13-14. Joel believed that he 
contributed "the value of me." R. 282, p. 73-74. In reality, 
Joel and Fred each gave to the other in a manner more like "The 
Gift of the Maji" than a business transaction. 
As Joel testified, the partnership's buying land was not a 
condition of his continuing to provide labor and Fred providing 
the money. Id. at 182. Instead, as Joel testified, the 
relationship with Joel had a much deeper meaning to Fred 
And I felt bad for him sitting up there in 
that chair and not anybody, anyone call him 
or do anything for him. It gave him life. I 
mean it gave him something to wake up in the 
morning for. And, yea, this is what we can 
do. He could think about things, plan things 
out. It gave him, you know, thoughts again. 
Id. at 183. 
Clearly, neither Fred nor Joel operated on the expectation 
that during their partnership either one's contribution should 
receive preferential status. Unfortunately, they did not foresee 
that, upon dissolution after Fred's death, Fred's heirs would 
insist on preferential treatment for Fred's contributions in a 
manner that would enrich them at Joel's expense. This result is 
contrary to any testimony from which Fred's intent might be 
inferred. 
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Furthermore, contrary to Appellant's contention, the facts 
demonstrate that Fred intended to contribute to Joel personally 
as opposed to investing in a business. Initially it was Fred who 
provided the impetus behind Joel's seriously exploring career 
options. Fred committed himself to enhancing Joel's future by 
offering him advice and money to establish any career. R. 253, 
R. 283 pg. 14. Once the cattle operation began, Fred desired to 
obtain land because he "desired to continue to assist his 
grandnephew Joel in business." R. 254. All of the testimony 
indicated that Fred's primary concern was Joel. 
Thus, the facts clearly and convincingly demonstrate Fred's 
intent to execute an intervivos gift to Joel of one-half of the 
capital he contributed to the partnership. 
B. Assessing the elements of "delivery" and "acceptance" 
requires a recognition that Fred#s giving Joel only 
one-half of the purchase price permitted him to 
complete delivery of this gift while retaining egual 
control over the assets purchased. 
For purposes of analyzing delivery and acceptance, Fred's 
gift to Joel of only a one-half interest in his capital 
contribut ion distinguishes this case from decisions where a donor 
allegedly relinquished 100% ownership. Fred intended to remain 
an equal one-half owner of any assets purchased with his retained 
half of his capital contribution monies. 
In the cases cited in Brief by the heirs/Appellants, 
Appellants' Br. at 31-32, because the donor allegedly gave up 
full ownership, delivery required irrevocable parting of title 
and control so complete that use without permission would 
constitute trespassing. Hopping v. Wood, 526 N.E.2d 1205 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1988). Utah courts, however, recognize that delivery 
can only be as complete "as the nature of the thing will admit 
of." Ross, 626 P.2d at 492. It would, therefore, be 
inappropriate to require that Fred, as a half-owner of purchased 
assets be treated like a trespasser if he makes use of the cattle 
or property he shares. 
Fred's gift of only a one-half interest in the money for 
purchase of the cattle and the property also dictated the manner 
of the gift's delivery and acceptance. Fred sent money and 
purchased cattle which he had delivered to Joel who accepted sole 
possession of the cattle titled in his name only. R. 254. Joel 
sold the cattle without accounting to Fred. R. 282, pp. 21, 87-
88. After the property was purchased, Joel accepted it as his 
shared estate. Id. He did not feel the need to consult Fred on 
decisions regarding the property's use. Id. at 162. Like Fred, 
he dreamed of building a home on the property. Id. at 100-01. 
Like Fred, he dreamed of becoming rich when the property was 
eventually sold for a million dollars. Id. at 155. Fred and 
Joel's purposeful business decisions as to title, tax returns and 
property taxes dispel any inferences contrary to "gift." See 
supra. Point II, Section D. 
Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Fred's 
completed gifts to Joel equalized their capital contributions for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1998). This court should 
therefore affirm the trial court's conclusions that (1) Joel and 
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the heirs are each entitled to one-half of the partnership assets 
and (2) the property and cattle should be sold and the net 
proceeds equally divided between the heirs and Joel.9 R. 258. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THIS COURT REVERSES THE GIFT DECISION IT CAN AFFIRM 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION ON WINDING UP THE PARTNERSHIP 
ON ALTERNATIVE THEORIES. 
If this Court should reverse the trial court's decision that 
half of Fred's capital contribution was a gift to Joel, then it 
may affirm on several alternative theories. An appellate court 
may affirm on any theory supportable on the record, even if that 
theory differs from the one stated by the trial court and "'even 
though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by 
appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court.'" Goodsel v. Dept. 
of Bus. Reg., 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974) (citation omitted); 
State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997) . 
A. Promissory estoppel provides an alternative basis for 
declaring that within this partnership labor and 
capital should be treated equally for purposes of 
distribution between partners. 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel requires proof that 
plaintiff acted in reasonable reliance on defendant's promise, 
defendant knew plaintiff relied on the promise which should 
reasonably induce action or forbearance, defendant was aware of 
the facts, and plaintiff's reliance resulted in plaintiff's loss. 
9The trial court also decided that Joel's wind-up labor was 
approximately equal to the heirs' tax payments. R. 258. 
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See Skanchv v. Calcados Orthope SA. 952 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Utah 
1998). Each of these elements can be found in the facts of this 
case. 
Fred's and Joel's threshold agreement that they would build 
a business out of Fred's money and Joel's labor is essentially a 
promise by Fred that, for all business purposes, Joel's labor 
would be treated equally with his money. R. 282, pp. 148, 85, 
73-74. Fred also promised to advise Joel with his wisdom. Id. 
at 148, 21-22. When Joel became nervous that their partnership 
relationship was not adequately formalized, Fred assured him that 
accurate record keeping was unnecessary. Id. at 21-22. Fred 
dissuaded Joel from seeking professional business advice with 
horror stories about lawyers. Id. at 102. Specifically, Fred 
persuaded Joel that he need not worry about protecting his 
ownership interest in the property after Fred's death: Joel had 
expressed the concern that "[t]he first thing that would happen 
is your kids would come and take everything I got." Id., at 55-
56. Fred responded: 
He looked at me and said, "Joel, don't worry 
about that." He goes, "if you died tomorrow, 
I would be in a hell of a mess. And he says, 
not only that, you are the only one that I 
see, ever talks to me. My kids they all have 
successful jobs. There [sic] all doing their 
own thing. There [sic] not even going to be 
around when I die." He was correct on that 
point. When he died, they were not around. 
Id. Thus, Fred promised, and convinced Joel to believe, that 
Joel's ownership rights were secure. Joel relied on this promise 
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by continuing to labor for the partnership and forbearing pursuit 
of formal, legalized agreements. And, Fred knew it. 
Joel estimated the value of his uncompensated efforts at 
$101,000. Id. at 70-72. He believed that he was half owner of 
an increasing heard of cattle and an appreciating piece of 
property. It would now be an unconscionable detriment to Joel 
not to enforce Fred's implicit promise that Joel owned half of 
the cattle and the property. During his life, Fred made no 
exceptions to this promise to Joel. This Court should not 
countenance the heirs creating an exception after Fred's death by 
according Fred's money protected status as a capital contribution 
with priority over Joel's labor contribution. 
B. Joel's and Fred's partnership understanding constituted 
an exception to the statutory priority accorded capital 
contributions in settling accounts between partners 
after dissolution, 
Fred and Joel expressly created a partnership understanding 
that was broad enough to override statutory provisions otherwise 
controlling the distribution of the partnership capital and 
assets upon dissolution. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1998), which 
sets forth rules for distribution, states: "In settling accounts 
between the partners after dissolution the following rules shall 
be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary." 
(emphasis added). Because there is no requirement that a 
contrary agreement be written, this Court may find such agreement 
expressly or by implication from the record. 
250\22885 1 
42 
The record unequivocally demonstrates that the terms of the 
partnership agreement were that, for all business purposes, 
Joel's labor would be equivalent to Fred's money. R. 2 82, pp. 
85, 148, 73-74, 96. It is appropriate on appeal to honor the 
partners' commitment to each other and to their partnership. 
The intended breadth of the partnership understanding, FULLY 
equating labor with money, arose out of the partners' respect for 
each others' unique and essential personal assets. Id. at 96. 
Both partners accepted the reality that the partnership could not 
exist without total interdependence. Id. For the partnership to 
survive, each partner had to count on the other to contribute 
freely whenever needed. Id. at 45. Between themselves, Joel and 
Fred needed no record keeping to compare their contributions. 
Id. at 21-22. Whatever they gave was immediately equal. Thus, 
the premise of "equal contributions through money or labor" 
became more than mere words. It controlled each partners' 
actions and each one's appreciation for the other's contribution. 
Fred recognized that Joel's labor was necessary for more 
than the daily needs of their partnership. Without Joel's 
efforts to locate property and negotiate an affordable price, 
Fred's available funds would be totally insufficient. Id. at 35, 
91, 152-54. Joel negotiated to reduce the property's price by 
almost $200,000 and to reduce taxes by $15,000 per year. Id. at 
91, 153, 159-60. 
Joel received no compensation for this effort despite the 
tremendous amount of money Fred saved, and Joel's efforts to save 
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money increased his own daily work load. When the cattle moved 
to the property, Joel had to work harder to care for them in two 
locations and access to the property was inadequate. Id. at 74, 
181. 
There is precedent supporting the theory that a partnership 
agreement equalizing labor and money justifies equal division of 
all assets on dissolution. Kuhl v Gardner, 894 P.2d 525 (Or. 
App. 1995). In this convoluted dispute, the parties had operated 
under the expressed agreement that defendant, a distant 
businessman, would put up all the money to purchase low income 
rentals properties while plaintiffs, a husband/wife team, would 
do all of the work to manage and maintain the rentals. The 
appellate court affirmed: (1) reestablishment of partnership 
including real estate titled in defendant's name; and (2) the 
order for accounting, dissolution, and equal division of assets 
including proceeds of all real estate sales. Jd. at 526 
Analogous to the instant case, plaintiffs in Kuhl had placed 
no monetary value on time invested and kept no records (defendant 
asked for none). Id. at 532. Just as Joel and Fred intended to 
reinvest and keep the property until it had substantially 
appreciated, the Oregon partnership agreed no profits would be 
distributed until dissolution after defendant's retirement in ten 
years when the properties would be liquidated. Id. 
Similarly, when defendant argued that the paper record 
showed no partnership was ever created, plaintiffs explained that 
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all properties were titled in defendants' name as a business 
decision. Id. at 528-30 (plaintiffs had declared bankruptcy). 
Ultimately, the trial court, noting the credibility of 
plaintiffs, believed the plaintiffs' theory of partnership: an 
agreement that plaintiffs' work equaled defendant's money. Id. 
at 532. The appellate court affirmed finding that "defendant got 
what he bargained for: "local management and servicing of the 
numerous properties, leaving him free to engage in his business 
1,000 miles away." Id. Thus, an oral agreement that one party 
provide all services while the other party provided all funds 
justifies equal distribution of proceeds of the sale of real 
estate without regard for capital contribution. 
An appellate court in New Mexico also affirmed the trial 
court's decision that the decedent and his partner had entered 
into an oral agreement that partnership assets of a ranching 
business would be equally divided regardless of their respective 
capital contributions. Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Williams, 630 
P.2d 1228 (N.M. 1981) (personal representative of deceased's 
estate brought action for partnership accounting). The partners 
were old friends and their partnership was based upon the 
deceased partner contributing most of the capital while the 
surviving partner did most of the labor. Id. at 122 9. 
The Citizens Bank court noted the statutory provision giving 
priority to return of capital contributions absent contrary 
agreement. Id. at 1230. It also rioted that the terms of a 
partnership agreement need not be written or "formally expressed, 
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but may be inferred or established, in whole or in part, from the 
acts of the parties." Id. at 1230-31. "This general principal 
applies with equal force to agreements to divide assets upon 
dissolution without repayment of capital contributions." Id. at 
1231. 
In applying these legal precepts to facts similar to the 
instant case, the appellate court stated: 
If there was ever a case which called upon the trial 
judge to exercise his discretion and apply equitable 
powers, it is this one. The record is replete with 
testimony that [the deceased wanted [his partner] to be 
taken care of; that [the deceased] felt [his partner] 
should eventually own the ranch; that [the partner] and 
his wife took care of the deceased and the ranch for 
many years. 
Id. at 1231. Noting "very imposing arguments" in opposition to 
the trial court's decision, the appellate court stated: 
However, we feel that as an appellate court, we should 
not retry this case. The trial judge hears the 
witnesses in person and has the opportunity to observe 
their demeanor and manner of testifying and has a much 
better grasp of the evidence in its entirety than we 
have. Based upon a cold record on appeal and absent an 
erroneous application of the law, we will not interfere 
with the trial court's decision. 
Id. The same law, the same facts, the same equities, and the 
same analysis applies in this case. 
Under the same legal principles, a Minnesota court affirmed 
a decision that an implied, oral agreement negated the right to 
return of capital contribution prior to division of partnership 
assets. Peterson v. Peterson, 169 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. 1969) . A 
surviving partner, the father of a deceased partner, had 
contributed capital to a chicken-hatchery partnership primarily 
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operated by the son. Upon his son's death, the father sought 
return of his capital, partly because he did not like his son's 
wife. Id. at 22 9. Based largely on the conduct of the partners, 
the father's fondness for his son, and the son's having done most 
of the labor in the business, the Peterson court affirmed that it 
was "entirely reasonable to infer that [the father] put up the 
capital and [the son] provided the labor under an agreement by 
which each was to own half of the business, including both 
capital and profits." Id. at 231. 
In essence, the trial court in this instant made the same 
determination in finding that upon dissolution, Joel was entitled 
to half of the cattle ranching partnership, including both 
capital and profits. The evidence so overwhelmingly supports 
this determination that, for this Court, it becomes a matter of 
determining the appropriate legal handle to support this 
equitable result. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT LABOR WAS NOT A 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE. 
The trial court erred in its conclusion that "Joel's labor 
was not a capital contribution." R. 258. This Court need only 
reach this issue if it reverses the trial court's decision that 
Fred gifted Joel one half of his capital contribution. Under 
those circumstances, the cross-appealed conclusion should be 
reviewed de novo as a question of law. See State v. Richardson, 
843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) (n/ [w]e consider the trial 
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court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a 
question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of 
that law for correctness"). 
For purposes of this issue there is no marshalling of 
contrary evidence. The trial court noted that its decision came 
from reading the case law cited in the parties' Trial Briefs. R. 
282, p. 204-05. The trial court noted that a majority of the 
cited cases weighed against labor being a capital contribution. 
Id. 
Joel has cross-appealed based upon his contention that the 
trial court should have recognized that the partnership 
agreement, along with the partners' intent and actions, created a 
limited, well-defined exception to the rule. First Fred and Joel 
agreed that Joel would contribute all the labor while Fred 
contributed all the money for their partnership. R. 73-74, 85, 
96, 148. The entire testimony demonstrates that, in conformance 
with this agreement, the partners conducted themselves as if 
Joel's labor equaled Fred's money for all business purposes. 
Therefore, any protected status that Fred's money achieved as a 
capital contribution should also be accorded to Joel's labor. 
Utah courts have determined that in partnerships where one 
partner contributes labor and the other money, the value of the 
working partner's services can be declared his capital 
contributions to the partnership. See Eardley v. Sammons, 330 
P.2d 122, 126 (Utah 1958). The Court recognized that it was 
reasonable for the laboring partner to expect compensation for 
250\22885 1 
48 
his services. However, upon dissolution, in the absence of a 
specific agreement about salaries, the court declared that the 
contribution of the partner risking money and the other risking 
his labor were both capital contributions. Id. 
The Tenth Circuit has also addressed this issue in reviewing 
a decision of the tax court. Farris v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 222 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1995). The Farris court 
assessed the partnership agreement between a silent partner who 
contributed $50,000 to a partnership and two other partners who 
contributed their personal services, expert skill and knowledge, 
stating: 
In the absence of a contrary provision in the agreement 
where one partner contributes money or physical assets 
and the other contributes personal services, skill and 
knowledge, they share in the capital assets according 
to the value placed on each contribution. 
Id. at 322 (citing Paul v. Cullum, 132 U.S. 539 (1889) (holding 
"contribution of services by one partner constituted a 
contribution to the capital structure and made him one of the 
joint owners and possessors of the property of the partnership.") 
Other state courts have also recognized that under 
appropriate circumstances, personal services of a laboring 
partner "may constitute a capital contribution to the 
partnership." Schvmanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 284 (Alaska 
1983) (emphasis original). Personal services may be capital 
contributions if there exists an express or implied agreement to 
tha t e f fec t . Id. 
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In the instant case, treating Joel's sweat equity as a 
capital contribution would be consistent with the above-
described, limited exceptions to the general rule. Recognizing 
that the exception should apply in this case would not jeopardize 
the stability of the general rule. Joel's situation involved a 
clearly expressed and undisputed understanding between the 
partners that one's labor equals the other's money. Because Fred 
and Joel honored this commitment throughout Fred's life, it is 
appropriate, if necessary, to recognize and honor that commitment 
in dissolving the partnership because of Fred's death. 
Therefore, if this Court reaches this issue, it should declare 
Joel's labor a capital contribution that is equal to Fred's 
capital contribution. This determination would permit this Court 
to affirm the trial court's conclusions as to dissolution of the 
partnership assets. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decisions finding 
a partnership between Fred and Joel that includes the property 
and declaring one-half of Fred's capital contributions a gift to 
Joel. If the gift decision is reversed, this Court may affirm 
the trial court's conclusions on winding up and dissolving the 
partnership by alternative theories, including reversing the 
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Offer to Purchase Real Property 
OFFER TO PURCHASE REAL.PROPERTY I 3 Q I 
1. BUYER. Joel C. Parker and Fred E. Parker, e*BuyerH) htreby offers to 
purchase from SF Pacific Properties Inc., ("Seller"), the real property 
hereinafter described upon the following terms and conditions. 
2. PROPERTY. The real property ("Property") which Is the subject of this 
offer consists of 973.26 acres, more or less, located near Little Mountain, 
County of Weber, State of Utah, together with all appurtenances thereto and 
Improvements thereon. 1f any. The Property Is more particularly described on 
Exhibit "A". 
3. PURCHASE PRICE. 
3.1 The Purchase Price to be paid by Buyer to Seller for the Property 
Is S116.893.00. 
4. DEPOSITS. 
4.1 HI thin five (5) calendar days of acceptance of this offer by 
Seller, Buyer shall deliver to Escrow Holder (as defined In Paragraph 5). a 
cashier's check In the sum of $2,500.00, which shall apply toward the Purchase 
Price. All deposits required under this paragraph 4 shall be hereinafter 
referred to as the "0epos1t". 
4.2 Escrow Holder is hereby authorized and Instructed to disburse to 
Seller the total of the Deposit, less $500.00, as provided In Paragrapn 7.2. 
Buyer hereby releases Escrow Holder for any claims arising out of Escrow 
Holder's compliance with the provisions of this Paragraph 4.2 and Paragraph 7.2. 
BUYER'S INITIALSrfT/,^" SELLER'S INITIALS fe\\W 
4.3 The balance of the Purchase Price, Including Buyer's Escrow fees 
and other closing costs, If any, shall be deposited with Escrow Holder, by 
cashier's check no later than 2:00 o'clock P.M. on the business day prior to 
the Closing Date (as defined In Paragraph 8.1). 
4.4 In the event Buyer shall fall to deliver the Deposit on or before 
the dates set forth In this Paragraph 4 or promptly to perform any other 
covenant or obligation contained In this Agreement. Seller may elect to 
specifically enforce this Agreement or to terminate this Agreement and retain 
as liquidated damages the amounts provided In Paragraph 4.5 of this Agreement. 
No waiver by Seller of any delinquency or default on the part of Buyer shall be 
construed as a waiver of any subsequent delinquency or default. 
4.5 IN THE EVENT SELLER ELECTS TO TERMINATE THIS AGREEMENT AS A RESULT 
OF A DELINQUENCY OR DEFAULT BY BUYER AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 4.4. OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, IN THE EVENT BUYER FAILS TO PERFORM ANY COVENANT OR OBLIGATION 
PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT, IT IS EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SELLER HILL INCUR 
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF SUCH DELINQUENCY, DEFAULT OR.JAILURE OF 
PERFORMANCE. AND IT IS FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH DAMAGES WILL BE EXTREMELY 
OIFFICULT TO CALCULATE AND ASCERTAIN. THEREFORE, IT IS EXPRESSLY AGREED THAT 
BUYER SHALL PAY TO SELLER LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF $2,000.00. NHICH 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE ARE REASONABLE IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FACTS KNOWN TO THEM 
ON THE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT, AND SUCH OAMAGES SHALL BE RETAINED BY SELLER FROM 
THE DEPOSIT. 
BUYER'S INITIALS. i Q j ""* SELLER'S INITIALS /foil 
5. ESCROW. 
5.1 The purchase and sale of the Property shall be consummated by means 
of an escrow ("Escrow") to be opened by Buyer within five (5) calendar days of 
acceptance of this offer by Seller at the office of Associated Title Company, 
4105 Harrison Blvd.. Sulto 200, Ogden, Utah 8*403 ("Escrow Hrtld«r"). 
5.2 Upon acceptance of this offer by Seller, Buyer shall request that 
Escrow Holder promptly prepare escrow instructions, on Its customary form, for 
the purchase and sale of the Property upon the terms and provisions hereof. 
The escrow Instructions shall be promptly signed by Buyer and Seller. The 
escrow Instructions shall not modify or amend the provisions of this Agreement 
unless otherwise expressly set forth therein. At the option of Escrow Holder 
this document may be considered as Its escrow instructions, with such further 
instructions as Escrow Holder shall require In order to clarify the duties and 
responsibilities of the Escrow Holder. 
6. PRELIMINARY TITLE REPORT AND DOCUMENTS. Within a reasonable period of 
time after the opening of escrow, Seller shall furnish Buyer with a preliminary 
title report ("PTR") concerning the Property Issued by Associated Title Company 
("Title Company") together with copies of all documents referred to in such PTR. 
7. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO FINAL PERFORMANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT. 
7.1 The following are conditions precedent to the final performance of 
rhu Agreement, and are not conditions precedent to Its formation: 
(a) Buyer's approval of the PTR, including legal description of the 
Property, which approval or disapproval shall be given within ten 
(10) calendar days of receipt thereof. 
7.2 In the event that such written approvals or disapprovals as 
required in Paragraph 7.1 above are not received by Seller and Escrow Holder on 
or before the date due, it shall be conclusively presumed that Buyer has 
unconditionally approved each of said matters. Upon approval of such matters, 
by either express written approval or by failure to deliver timely disapproval, 
Escrow Holder shall disburse to the Seller the Deposit, less $500.00, as 
provided 1n Paragraph 4.2. 
7.3 In the event that Buyer delivers timely disapproval or conditional 
approval of the PTR, or any part thereof, or any of the Items referred to in 
Paragraph 7.1, then for a period of ten days after receipt of such written 
notice by Seller, Seller, by written notice to Buyer, may elect to cure said 
disapproved or conditionally approved Items prior to the close of escrow. If 
Seller does not elect to cure all of said items, then for a period of ten days 
after said written notice to Buyer, Buyer shall have the right either to accept 
title to the Property subject to said items, thereby waiving any and all claims 
against Seller by reason thereof, or to terminate this Agreement. Buyer shall 
give written notice to Seller of Buyer's election within ten days after either 
<1> receipt of Notice of Seller's election not to cure, or (11) the expiration 
of the time In which Seller snail have been rvqulivd lo respond to Buyor's 
notice of disapproval or conditional approval. If Buyer shall fail to give 
Seller such written notice of Buyer's election within the time specified, it 
shall be conclusively presumed that Buyer has elected to terminate this 
Agrwiwnt Tf Buyer elects to terminate this Agreement, thereafter neither 
Buyer nor Seller shall have any further liability hereunder, except that Buyer 
shall be entitled to the prompt return of a11 funds deposited by Buyer with 
Escrow Holder, less only escrow cancellation fees and costs and title company 
charges, all of which Buyer hereby agrees to pay. 
8. CLOSING. 
8.1 Escrow Holder shall dose the escrow on or before June 28. 1991 
("Closing Oate"). 
8.2 Seller shall deliver or cause to be delivered to Buyer through 
escrow: 
(a) A Grant Deed 1n proper form duly executed and recordable conveying 
to Buyer fee title to the Property subject only to (1) the 
exceptions approved by Buyer pursuant to Paragraph 7 hereof, and 
(11) a reservation by Seller of all mineral rights and certain 
other covenants In the form attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
(b) A standard coverage owner's form poltcy of title tnsurance Issued 
by the Title Company In the full amount of the Purchase Price 
Insuring title vested In Buyer subject only to the printed 
provisions of such policy and to the exceptions approved by Buyer 
pursuant to Paragraph 7 hereof. 
8.3 Buyer shall deliver or cause to be delivered to Seller through 
escrow the Purchase Price as set forth In Paragraph 3 hereof. 
8.4 Both parties shall execute and deliver through escrow any other 
documents or instruments which are reasonably necessary In order to consummate 
the purchase and sale of the Property. 
9. CONDITION OF PROPERTY; BUYER'S INTENDED USE. 
9.1 Buyer acknowledges that 1t offers and desires to purchase the 
Property "as Is" and without representation or warranty from Seller with 
respect to the condition of the Property Including, but not limited to, the 
condition of the soil, presence of hazardous materials or contaminants, and 
other physical characteristics. Buyer shall perform and rely solely upon Its 
own independent Investigation concerning the physical condition of the Property. 
9.2 Seller has not and does not hereby make any representation or 
warranty to Buyer concerning the Property or Its compliance with any statutes, 
ordinance or regulation. Buyer shall perform and rely solely upon Its own 
Independent Investigation concerning the Property's compliance with any 
applicable law. 
9.3 Buyer represents that Its Intended use of the Property 1s grazing. 
Buyer shall perform and rely solely upon Its own Investigation concerning Its 
intended use of the Property, the Property's fitness therefore, and the 
availability of such intended use under applicable statutes, ordinances and 
regulations. 
10. PRORATIONS AND EXPENSES. 
10.1 Real property taxes shall be prorated as of the Closing Date, based 
upon the latest tax bill available. Assessments of record which are not yet 
due shall be assumed by Buyer, or paid off by Seller, at Buyer's option. 
10.2 All title report and title Insurance costs, recording fees, 
documentary transfer taxes, escrow fees and any costs connected with the 
closing of this sale shall be charged to or divided between the Seller and 
Buyer by the Escrow Holder as 1s customary 1n the County of Ogden. 
11. POSSESSION. Possession of the Property shall be delivered to Buyer at the 
Closing Oate. 
12. INTEGRATION. The contract resulting from Seller's acceptance hereof 
contains the entire agreement of the parties and cannot be amended or modified 
except by a written agreement. 
13. BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS. The parties acknowledge and represent that there 
Is no person who Is entitled to a commission, finder's fee or other like 
compensation arising In any matter from this Agreement. Each party agrees to 
defend, Indemnify and hold the other party harmless from and against each claim 
for commission or finder's fee, and the costs and expense Incurred by the other 
party 1n connection with such claims which are asserted against the other party 
by a person or party other than the Broker who alleges that It was engaged or 
retained by such party, or that 1t was the procuring cause for instrumental In 
consummating this Agreement. 
14. INTERPRETATION. This Agreement shall be construed. Interpreted and 
applied In accordance with the laws of the State Utah. 
15. ASSIGNABILITY. Buyer shall not assign Its rights or interests under this 
Agreement without the express written consent of Seller. In the event Seller's 
consent to an assignment by Buyer of Its rights and Interest pursuant to this 
Agreement is given, such consent shall not relieve or excuse Buyer of any of 
its obligations arising under this Agreement unless such written consent shall 
expressly so provide. 
16. TIME. Time 1s of the essence of this Agreement. 
17. SEVERABILITY. In the event that any provision of this Agreement 1s found 
to be Invalid or unenforceable, such determination shall nut affect the 
validity and enforceability of any other provision of this Agreement. 
18. RIGHT OP ENTRY. 
18.1 Buyer and Its Agents may enter on the Property at all reasonable 
times while this Agreement Is In effect to plant grass, make tests, surveys, 
studies ami Inspections In connection with the Property, provided that prior to 
the exercise of said right and at all times while Buyer or Its agents are 
present upon the Property, Buyer shall arrange for, keep and maintain In full 
force and effect a policy of comprehensive general liability Insurance with a 
combined single limit of not less than $2,000,000, and shall furnish to Seller 
a certificate of such Insurance which names Seller as an additional insured ana 
provides that such policy shall not be cancelled or amended without thirty (30) 
days prior written notice to Seller. Buyer shall Indemnify and defend Seller 
against and hold Seller harmless from, any and all liability, cost and expense 
for loss of or damage to any property or injury to or death of any person, 
arising out of or In any way related to the exercise of the right to enter the 
Property granted hereunder un1«» >uch liability, eost and oxponce 1c caused by 
the sole, active negligence of Seller. 
All costs Incurred in connection with tests, surveys, studies. 
Inspections, reviews, approvals, determinations and applications made by or on 
behalf of Buyer under this Agreement or in connection with Buyer's proposed use 
of the Property shall be paid by Buyer. In the event of the recordation of any 
claim of lien for materials supplied or labor or professional services 
performed on behalf of Buyer, Buyer shall promptly satisfy and discharge such 
Hen at Buyer's sole cost and expense upon demand therefore by Seller. 
18.2 Reports and Studies. Buyer shall provide to Seller a copy, of each 
report, study, regulation or ordinance obtained by Buyer In connection with Its 
approvals under Paragraph 7. In addition, 1f the purchase and sale of the 
Property Is not consummated for any reason, Buyer shall deliver to Seller free 
of charge all of the engineering, architectural, financial and other studies, 
drawings, reports, surveys and similar materials prepared by or on behalf of 
Buyer with respect to the Property and Buyer's proposed project to the extent 
Buyer 1s legally entitled to do so. 
19. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1446. Seller Is not a "foreign person" as 
that term Is used In Internal Revenue Code Section 1445 CIRC Section 1445") 
and Seller agrees to furnish Buyer, prior to Close of Escrow, a Non-Foreign 
Certification or any other documentation required under IRC Section 1445 to 
evidence that Seller Is not a "foreign person." 
20. INTERSTATE LAND SALES FULL DISCLOSURE ACT. Seller conducts its Operation 
in accordance with the requirements of the Interstate Land Sales Full 
Disclosure Act, and, in this connection, Buyer shall execute and deliver to 
Seller an affidavit In the form attached hereto as Exhibit "C" 1n order to 
qualify the sale of the Property for exemption from said Act. 
21. PRELIMINARY CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP. Buyer shall execute and deliver to 
Escrow Holder an appropriate Preliminary Change of Ownership Form. 
22. NOTICES. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be 
In writing and shall be effective upon personal delivery or upon three (3) days 
after deposit in the United States Mall, postage prepaid and addressed as 
follows: 
TO SELLER: SF Pacific Properties Inc. 
c/o Catellus Development Corporation 
Attn: Regional Sales Manager 
201 Mission Street - Suite 250 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
TO BUYER: Joel C. Parker and Fred E. ParJttr 
4343 West 1800 South 
Ogden. Utah 84401 
The foregoing addresses may be changed by written notice. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. 
23.1 This offer to purchase by Buyer shall remain Irrevocably open 
until 5:00 p.m. on April 5, 1991, and If not accepted by Seller by said date 
shall be deemed revoked. 
23.2 Seller may accept this offer to purchase by delivering to Buyer 
In person or depositing Into the United States mall one copy of this 




Accepted this 41ti day of , 19 dl 
SF Pacific Propartlts Inc.. 
By Cat* 11 us Dmlopmtnt Corporation, Its agent 
Bv: I »VAA/<'W^\AJIXA>. . . -
REGIONAL $ALES MANAGER 
T1 t l 8; SALES ft LAND MANAftFMfNT 
UT0570OO6P, UT0570014P, UT0570015P 
WPPCXF43 
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EXHIBIT C 
AFFIDAVIT 
Stata of '.^'o-kc.' > ^  
County of fil*'*^ > 
j - p , c . r £ . , * « * <«— °f »ffUnt>- beift' f1 rs t du,y 
sworn hereby declares: 
^ c / i / j * ' ? * ? * /nami of our chaser or lessee) Is a 
partnership, trust or other business entity). 
2. That said _ J * . W W 'fS^^rS'^SSii £ M 
other business entltjfc if Purcjas^'or ^^JJferen" ncorporated herein, 
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by^  th1$tnr^0^ft9BtntC to%eU. lease or 
^ ^ ^ ^
u u T ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ '" C0"mercU1 or 
Industrial business. 
*HW \K' dav ff |Vl^>tg^ 19j_L 
Executed on this • * ft +. W OT — < 
atjl^jlu . 3SZ&-
tubscrU.d »r.d sworn to Mfore «. on PV- > ^ 2 1 — • " - i - -
Notary Pyonc % • « 
ADDENDUM B 
Agreement of Purchase and Sale 
AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AMD SALE 
THIS AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AMD BhhZ (hereinafter 
toMtiaee rafarrad to as the • Agreement" J, made and entered into 
thie Z^+^day of IV^c^bt^ 1995, by and between JOEL 
PARKER (hereinafter some time a referred to aa the ••Seller1') and 
TIM G00CH, an individual, and OOOCH LAND AVD LiVBSTOCK, I.e., a 
Utah limited liability company (aaid individual and aaid limited 
liability company hereinafter aonetimes jointly and severally 
referred to aa the uBuyer"), 
WITNESSETH: 
WHERKAS, Seller ia the owner of certain oattle, which 
the Seller deairea to aell and the Buyer deairee to puxcheae upon 
the terma and conditions hereinafter Set forth; 
NOW, THERSFOBB, in consideration of the premise* and 
for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto 
do hereby mutually agree ea foil ova: 
1. Purchase and fl»i« The Seller hereby agrees to 
Bell, transfer and convey to the Buyer, and the Buyer hereby 
agrees to purchase from the Seller, upon the terms and condition* 
hereinafter aet forth, ail of the Seller* a right, title, intercat 
and eguity in and to the following described cattle (hereinafter! 






2. Purchase Price. The Buyer agrees to pay to the 
Seller for the Cattle the total puxchaee prloe of FIFinr-EIGHT 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-6BVEN DOLLARS C$50,437.00) 
(hereinafter aometines referred to aa the "Purchase Price") 
pursuant to the terns of a written promiaaory note free the Buy*? 
to the Cellar, in the form attached hereto aa Exhibit "A" 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to ae the "Promiaaory mote"), to 
be executed by the Buyer and delivered to the seller upon 
execution hereof/ providing for payment of aald Purchase Price, 
together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per ennmm 
from December 1, 1995, in seven (7) annual paymenta, on or before 
December 1 of each year commencing with the yeex 1996, of all 





in an amount (not to exoeed TE» THOUSAND DQLL&RS ($10,000.00) pec 
year) equal to one-half (1/2) of all net pro fit • made by the 
Maker during the previoua year from the sale or use of the Cattle 
(or their substitutes or replacements); followed by one (1) 
payment, on or before November 1, 2003, gf all remaining interest 
due thereunder and the entire remaining principal balance of the 
Purchase Price. 
3. Effective Date. This transaction shall be 
effective as of November 1, 199$ (the "effective Date"), 
regardless of the date on which this Agreement is executed. All 
personal property taxes, insurance premiums and other expenses, 
If any, or or relating to the Cattle shall he prorated between 
the Seller and the Buyer as of the Effective Date and paid within 
sixty (60) days after the Effective Date. 
4. flellfu"fl Indemnification R e a d i n g Title. The 
parties acknowledge that Seller holds legal title to the Cattle, 
but that the heirs of Fred S. Parker, deceased, may hold an 
equitable interest therein as a result of a partnership or other 
relationship between Seller and said Fred E. Parker prior to his 
death. Seller agrees to indemnify, protect, and save and hold 
Buyer harmless against and in respect of any and all claims, 
lOSBes, liabilities, damages, costs, deficiencies or expanses 
(including attorney's fees) that may result from the d a l e s of 
said heirs to the Cattle. 
5. V*\* ?"A *n"*§mirttl Unless otherwise agreed in 
writing by the parties, seller shall deliver title and possession 
of each of the Cattle to Buyer as each animal is removed by the 
Buyer from the aforesaid premises and the brand inspection 
certificate applicable to that animal is issued. 
6. Security-
A. The promissory mote shall be secured by the 
Buyer1 a transfer to the Seller of an equitable interest as a 
secured party in all of the Cattle which are the subject of thlaj 
traaB&fltion, and in all accounts receivable, proceeds, payments 
In kind, or government entitlements due under or related thereto 
including any proceeds and produots therefrom and any after-
acquired, substitute, or replacement property of the same nature, 
kind, class, or description, The Sailer* e security interest in 
said assets shall be a first lien thereon. 
B. The Promissory mote shall be further securef 
by tae Buyer1 s transfer to the Seller of an equitable interest as 
a secured party in all other cattle and other livestock owned by 
the Buyer, and in all accounts receivable, prooeeds, payments In 
kind, or government entitlements due under or related thereto, 
9CJ\U0€5.1 
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including any proceeds and products therefrom and any after-
acquired, substitute, or replacement property of the same nature, 
kind, class, or description. The Seller's security interest in 
said aaeats shall be a second lion thereon until the existing 
first lien thereon shall be paid, whereupon the 8eller' s security 
interest, therein shall become a first lien thereon. 
C, The security inters*ts provided for 
hereinabove shall be documented by a Security Agreement in the 
fere attached hereto as Exhibit "Ba and by this reference 
incorporated herein and such financing statements and other 
documents or instruments as the Seller may require to perfect 
said security interest. 
D. Bxospt aa otherwise agreed In writing by 
Buyer end Seller, the Buyer shall obtain ana maintain a casualty 
insurance polloy to cover all assets securing the Promissory Note 
as hereinabove provided with loss payable to the Seller in an 
amount not less than the unpaid balance under the Promiseory 
Note, in the event of damage to or loflB gf any Of said aasets* 
the Seller shall be entitled to the proceeds of said policy to 
the extent of the amount necessary to pay said Promissory Note in 
full. 
E. The Buyer shall purchase and maintain in 
force a life insurance polloy issued by a company satisfactory to 
tha Seller, providing for the payment of death benefits in an 
amount not less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) 
upon tha death of Tim Gooch, one o£ the Buyers herein. Ontli the 
Promissory Note is paid in full, the owner and beneficiary of 
aaid policy shall be the Seller, and ell of said death benefits 
shall be paid to the seller upon the death of said Tin Gooch 
(regardless of the then outstanding balance due under the 
Promissory Mote). The Promissory rote shall be deemed satisfied 
to the extent of the life insurance prooeeds so paid to the 
Seller. The Buyer shall pay to the seller the amount of each 
premium due under said polioy at leeet ten (10) days prior to the 
due date thereof. Upon payment in full of the Promissory note, 
the Seller shall, at the Buyer e option, transfer the ownership 
of said life insurance policy to the Buyer. 
7. Cattlp finifl »^ f n». The Cattle which are the 
subject of this Agreement are being sold "as is"; the Seller 
hereby expressly denies any express or implied warranties 
concerning performance or fitness of the came. The Buyer is 
familiar with and has inspected and accept* -the cattle Nae is" 
and in their condition as of the Effective Date. 
8. Aufrhnrifcy of yflin1l-ed T^ lanilitv CABPATIV. The Buyer 
representee and warrants that Gooch Land and Liveetook, U C. , is 
M6U00CS.1 
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organised end existing under the laws of the 8tste of Utah and 
ha* full power and authority to enter into this agreement, that 
thla agreement is valid and enforceable against said Buyer in 
accordance with its terms, and that the execution and delivery of 
this agreement and all related documents and instruments does 
not, end the oonaumaatioa of the transaction contemplated hereby 
will not, violate any provision of any charter, bylaw, mortgage, 
lien, lease, agreement, instrument, order, judgment, or decree to 
which the Buyer is a party or by which he is bound, and will not 
violate any restriction of any kind or character whatsoever to 
which said Buyer is subjact. 
9. Bayers ygeprda. The Buyer agrees to keep full 
and complete books and record* of his use and sale of the said 
Cattle and of all enacts securing the Promissory Note, and shall 
permit the Seller and hie representatives to have access at all 
reasonable times to any and all such books, records and other 
related information in order to review and make copies thereof 
for the purpose of confirming the Buyer1 s compliance with the 
provisions hereof or for any other reasonable purpose. 
10. Indemnification. 
A. The Seller will indemnify, protect, and save 
and hold the Buyer harmless against and in respect of any and all 
liabilities of the Seller of any nature* whether accrued, 
absolute, contingent, or otherwise, existing on the Effective 
Date, incurred in the ownership or use of the Cattle, except as 
otherwise specifically set forth herein. 
B. The Buyer will indemnify, protect and nave 
and hold the Seller harnless against and in rospeot o£ any and 
all liabilities of the Buyer of any nature, whether accrued, 
absolute, contingent, or Otherwise, accruing after the effective 
Date, lnourred in the ownership or use of the Cattle or any of 
the assets securing the Buyer* s obligations hereunder, except ee 
otherwise specifically set forth herein. 
C. Bach party will indemnify, protect, and save 
and hold the other party harnless against and In respect of any 
and all claims, losses, liabilities, damages, costs, 
deficiencies, or expenses resulting from any misrepresentation, 
material omission, breach of warranty, or nonfulfillment of any 
covenant or agreement on the part of the Indemnifying party under 
or relating to tnis agreement, and any and all actions, suits, 
proceedings, demands, assessments, judgments, costs, legal and 




11. flatlflftfl* Any anfl a l l notices, designations, 
of fers , acceptances, or any other communications to be given t o 
e i ther of the part ies hereto shall he personally delivered t o 
such party or nailed t o BUCh party by registered or c e r t i f i e d 
mail, return rece ipt requested, at the addraaa indicated below: 
Notices to se l l er : 
Joel C. Parker 
8083 West 900 South 
Ogden. Utah 84404 
Notices to Buyer: 
Tim Qoooh 
Gooch Land and Livestock Ii,C. 
1657 North 4500 West 
Meet Point, Utah 840IS 
Either party may change the place of address aforesaid by written 
notice to the other party. Notice shall be deemed to have been 
given upon the date of personal delivery thereof or upon 
depositing the same in the United States mails as aforesaid. 
12* interpretation. The provisions of this agreement 
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. The paragraph headings ocntained herein are 
for purposes of reference only and shall not limit, expand, or 
Otherwise affect the interpretation of any provision hereof. 
Whenever the context requires, the singular shall include the 
plural, the plural shall include the singular, the whole shall 
include any part thereof# any gender shall include the masculine, 
feminine and neuter gender, and the term "person11 ahall include 
any individual, firm, partnership (general or limited), joint 
venture, corporation, limited liability company, truat9 
asaociation, or other entity or association or any combination 
thereof. If any provision of this agreement or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstance shall he invalid or 
unenforceable to any extent, the remainder of this agreement and 
the application of such provision to other persons or 
circumstances chall not be affected thereby and shall be enforced 
to the extent permitted by applicable law. 
13. XaiXftr. A waiver of any breach of any of the 
tarns or conditions of this agreement shall not operate or be 
construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach thereof. 
14. £££nol. The provisions of this agreement shall 
bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their 
respective permitted successors and assigns* The parties hereby 
MSUWtt.l 
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agree for themselves, add for their successors and assigns, to 
execute any instrument8 and to perform any pat which nay bo 
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this agreement. 
15. amanflmanfcs. This agreement pete forth the entire 
understanding of the parties with respect tjo the subject matter 
hereof, and all prior negotiations, understandings, 
representations, inducements and agreements], whether oral or 
written and whether made by a party hereto (or by any one acting 
on behalf of a party, shall be deemed to he nerged in this 
agreement and a hall be Of no further force or eff ect. H O 
amendment, modification, or Change in this agreement shall be 
valid or binding unless reduced to writing and alined by all of 
the parties hereof. 
16. B«wjmme rtf BnfftrfiPffiMt: the parties agree that 
should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements 
contained herein, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney'a fee, which may arise 
or aoorue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, 
whether such remedy la pursued by filing suit or otherwise, and 
regardleee of whether such coats, fees andyor expenses are 
incurred in oonnectlon with any bankruptcy! proceeding, 
17. fg ff»flt>,lPfctm- *be parties agree that no 
presumption shall be attached to this agreement because it say 
hare been prepared by one of the parties or by one party1 s 
attorney. 
18. Bpeoifio pfgformmno, Sach party' s obligations 
under this agreement are unique, zn the event that any party 
should default in its obligations under this agreement, the 
parties each acknowledge that it would bejextremaly impracticable 
to measure in full all of the resulting damages; accordingly, the 
nondefaulting party/ in addition to any other available rights or 
remedies, may sue in equity for specific performance and the 
parties each expressly waive the defense that a remedy in damages 
will be adequate (without, however, waiving ita respective right 
to pursue the remedy of damages if it electa to do so). 
19. *!»« nt RBBiince. Tire is hecahy expressly 
declared to be of the essence of this agreement and of each and 
every provision hereof. 
20. Counterparts; Facsimile (fexl Deeumnni-.a. This 
agreement may be executed in any number of oounttrparts, each of 
which when executed and delivered shall ^c deemed to be an 
original, and all of which shall together constitute one and the 
same instrument. Facsimile transmission |of any signed original 
M5YU06U 
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document, end retransmission of any elgned faosimila 
transmission, shall be the sane an delivery of an original. 
21. Authority nf Slonsra. if any party lwxeto Is a 
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, trust, 
estate or other entity, the person executing this agreement on 
behalf of such party warrants hie or her authority to do so en* 
to Mad such party. 
agreement 
in KITUEB8 WHEREOF, the parties have executed 
this ^27^ day of DttcxKbir , i$«. 
this 
fiKLLER; 
GOOCH LAUD AH0 LIVESTOCK, I- C. , a 
otah limited liability company 
By: 
805M0065.1 
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